Value Based Accounting
EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION by Kapnick, Harvey
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research Baruch College 
1976 
Value Based Accounting EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION 
Harvey Kapnick 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_pubs/1075 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 







Arthur Andersen & Company
February 17, 1976
[Introductory note: In May 1970 Harvey Kapnick was elected Chairman of Arthur
Andersen & Company, the firm he joined in Chicago in 1948. In 1956, at the age of
30, he became a partner and seven years later he was made Managing Partner of the
company's Cleveland office. He has been a member of the Board of Directors since
1966.
Mr. Kapnick was born in Michigan. After serving as an officer in the Army Air
Force, he was graduated from Cleary College in Ypsilanti, Michigan, and attended
Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Michigan 1947-48.
He received an honorary degree, Doctor of Science in Business Administration,
from Cleary College in June of 1971. He and his wife and three sons live in
Winnetka, Illinois.
A Council Member at large of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Mr. Kapnick is also
treasurer, trustee, and director of numerous educational, cultural and philanthropic institutions.
[note: Fair Value Accounting -- this concept has been given new emphasis with the Sandilands proposal in
Britain. The demands for international standards of accounting are increasing. The concept of fair value
accounting cuts across national boundaries, philosophies and interests so that meaningful international standards
are feasible.
If the British go ahead with the Sandilands current cost concept, and, if the United States goes ahead with price
level accounting, we will find ourselves in such chaos that international standards are going to evolve whether
we like it or not. The only question is how.]
Accounting based on values has been discussed more during the last forty years by accountants as
providing more useful data based on economic facts than any other subject. Yet, what results in practice
do we have to show for all these speeches, articles, papers, and books? Almost nothing! Why has there
been so little real progress when an obvious need for change has become increasingly evident for many
years?
While the accounting profession has had its share of inertia and problems, it has also lost great
opportunities for service. The leadership in the profession has been ineffective in getting accounting
standards in the United States on a sound conceptual basis. Further, business leadership, government
regulators, and others have not persuaded the accountants to become realistic in reporting the economics
of business operation. Confusion and a lack of realism have been the result.
The Accounting Lag
The rate of change in the way business is conducted has accelerated greatly in recent decades. Today,
there are large corporations (including multinationals and conglomerates), complex income taxes, lease
financing, pension plans, an energy crisis, electronic computers, and transfer prices. The present
business scene includes not only these but also many other far-reaching developments, plus a maze of
governmental regulation, a rapid rate of technological change, world-wide inflation, and a perceived
need for public financial reporting that encompasses ever shorter time intervals, i.e., quarterly.
Being man-devised and man-implemented, accounting should be expected to adjust to such changing
conditions, as do social behavior, ethical standards, and the common law. However, since most
individuals are disposed to resist change, a tendency exists, without some overriding force, for changes
to lag behind the need. After making allowance for what might be described as a normal lag, accounting
still is so far behind the rate of change that has occurred in the environment in which business operates
that it is a source of embarrassment. How can our watchwords, "generally accepted accounting
principles," receive high marks for providing relevant financial information when the business
environment has changed so much in recent decades while accepted principles have changed so little?
A variety of reasons has contributed to the lack of progress. The accounting profession may have failed
to grasp the significance of its role despite the increasing importance accorded to the financial reporting
of business enterprises. The standard -- setting function is now on third base in the form of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, after being on second base with the Accounting Principles Board and on
first base with the Committee on Accounting Procedure. Each of these organizations has had different
responsibility, authority, and composition. Whether the team ever scores remains to be seen.
A factor contributing to the delay has been the accounting profession's preoccupation with the need to
narrow the range of equally acceptable alternative accounting and reporting practices. An enormous
investment of time and resources has gone into the quest for uniformity. This effort has essentially been
within an outmoded conceptual framework, and the goal of revising and reformulating accounting
principles to better meet the needs of a changing business environment has, for all practical purposes,
been lost in the shuffle. Uniformity as a goal within the historical-cost framework may by hindsight
have been an unfortunate decoy.
The efforts of the accounting profession to improve accounting standards and principles have been
dominated by CPAs in public practice, and the auditing aspects of problems have always been a
significant consideration to them. When useful information for investors is our goal, what is easiest to
audit may not be the most useful.
Objectives Long Overdue
Accounting has suffered from a void attributable to a lack of agreement about the objectives of the
accounting and reporting process. This subject has not been raised much above the level of an academic
exercise. This lack of agreement with respect to objectives has seriously handicapped efforts to resolve
accounting problems and controversies. Objectives, authoritatively supported, could provide the goal,
the road map, the unifying force, and the direction needed to stimulate the process by which accounting
standards could become relevant and result in truly meaningful and useful financial statements.
The Committee on Accounting Procedure made a few half-hearted attempts to consider objectives but
never really accomplished anything in this regard. The Accounting Principles Board commissioned two
research studies in this area. Several years later, the APB produced Statement No. 4 on basic concepts
and accounting principles that was nothing but a meaningless attempt to rationalize from existing
practices back to concepts and principles, which cannot be done on any reasonable basis. One
potentially positive step was the publication in 1973 by the AICPA of the Report of the Study Group on
the Objectives of Financial Statements. However, the Financial Accounting Standards Board since its
inception in 1973 has dealt with various subjects without any established objectives. A public hearing
was held on this subject in September, 1974. A second public hearing will probably not be held before
September, 1976. This continuing delay is becoming increasingly intolerable, resolution of this matter
in the foreseeable future cannot be predicted with much confidence.
Views of Our Firm on Objectives
In the absence of any authoritative set of objectives, each of us must establish our own in determining
what concepts and standards would best serve the users of financial statements in today's environment.
Our firm has held the view for some time that the approach to corporate financial accounting should be
value based rather than cost based. This was the position taken in 1972, as set forth in our book,
Objectives of Financial Statements for Business Enterprises. Advocated therein was the viewpoint that
the overall purpose of financial statements is to communicate information concerning the nature and
value of the economic resources of a business enterprise, the interests of creditors and the equity of
owners in the economic resources, and the changes in the nature and value of those resources from
period to period.
Later in 1974, our firm published a book, Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises Throughout
the World, which expands further our views with respect to objectives and sets forth a complete set of
illustrative financial statements, including notes, on the basis of the objectives, concepts, and standards
as we view them.
Economic resources are defined as those elements of wealth that possess the three basic characteristics
of utility, scarcity and exchangeability, which in combination give the resources economic value.
Exchangeability, as the term is used, is not intended to suggest that an economic resource is necessarily
readily marketable or that it is being held for immediate sale. Rather, exchangeability means that an
economic resource is something that is separable from a business as a whole and that has value in and of
itself -- that it is not solely dependent on the fortunes of the particular business enterprise to which the
resource is attached.
The basic characteristics prescribed for economic resources tend to exclude the wide assortment of
unidentifiable intangibles or attributes of a business enterprise that may give it an advantage over others
in a relatively free, competitive economic system and, hence, enable it to achieve earnings beyond a
normal rate of return on capital. The attributes of unidentifiable intangibles may be extremely valuable -
- they may arise through deliberate effort or accidentally -- but information about their quality and
potential value should be conveyed primarily by earnings information rather than through direct
measurement and inclusion in the balance sheet as assets.
A value-based approach also determines the companion earnings concept. If earnings are based on the
measurement of economic resources, then periodic earnings will be determined by the change in the
owners' equity shown by comparative balance sheets, after a provision for the maintenance of owners'
capital to reflect the effects of inflation and after allowing for additional investments by owners and
distributions to owners. In other words, the earnings concept is ultimately based on changes in the value
of the net assets. However, unless inflation is taken into consideration, much of what is traditionally
viewed as income may not exist in real terms. Thus, making a provision for capital maintenance in
terms of purchasing power should be a key factor in income measurement.
An observation made many years ago by one of my former professors, W. A. Paton, is still very
pertinent:
"...it is really values that are the basic data of accounting, and costs are important only
because they are the most dependable measures of initial values of goods and services
flowing into the enterprise through ordinary market transactions."(1)
Value Basis Does Not Involve Valuing a Business Enterprise As a Whole
An important distinction that is implicit in our approach to the objectives of financial accounting
concerns the difference between valuing individual assets and valuing the business enterprise as a
whole. The function of financial accounting, in our view, is not to value the business as a whole, but
rather to convey value information about the economic resources of a business.
This distinction recognizes the need to segregate the accounting function from the investor function.
The evaluations and interpretations made by investors based in part on information provided by
financial statements should not be allowed to affect or to be introduced directly into those financial
statements. For example, the total market value of a company's securities represents the market's
valuation of the enterprise at a particular time, but such valuation has no place in the enterprise's
financial statements. Failure to observe this segregation of functions in the past has introduced a
circularity that has reduced the usefulness of financial information and has resulted in great confusion in
the resolution of individual accounting problems (e.g., goodwill) and in growing confusion over
responsibilities for financial forecasts.
Segregation of these functions requires that a careful distinction be made between presenting financial
information and predicting the future. While financial statements should be presented in a manner that
will assist as much as possible in assessing the future and its risks, the role of accounting and the
resulting financial statements is not to predict or to interpret the future. Making predictions and reaching
economic decisions are the responsibilities of management in operating the enterprise, and of the
investors and other users of financial statements for their various purposes.
Man has always wanted to know about the future so that the uncertainties of his existence can be
overcome. Therefore, an interest in every kind of financial information about the future is
understandable, since investors are more interested in the future, more concerned about the uncertainty
that may surround investments, than in past performance. However, predicting the future is the very
essence of the investor function, and the investor who predicts correctly will reap rewards, whereas the
investor who predicts incorrectly may incur substantial losses.
Confusion constantly arises between changes in value and changes in purchasing power. The fact is
both are occurring and, while there may be an interrelationship, the effects of each should be accounted
for separately. Thus, the debate concerning whether value accounting or price-level accounting should
prevail is not on point, because in the long run both should prevail. The real changes in value should be
segregated from changes resulting only from changes in price levels.
The problem is one of presenting the economic facts in the most useful and understandable manner.
This seems so obvious that it is difficult to understand why the accounting profession continues to make
excuses for inaction.
Traditional Basis of Accounting Being Challenged Around the World
With inflation being a chronic problem throughout the world for the last twenty years, and with the
problems of obtaining and maintaining capital in business enterprises, historical cost has come under
increasing challenge -- and for good reasons. In fact, the developments in the United States have tended
to lag behind those of many other countries.
The accounting profession in the United Kingdom has issued a provisional statement suggesting the
presentation of supplementary price-level financial statements; however, that statement is likely to be
superseded by the recommendations of the government-sponsored Sandilands Committee for a value
approach for productive property, inventories, and marketable securities. The profession in Canada has
issued an exposure draft dealing with supplemental price-level financial statements and is working on
value accounting, whereas Australia has two exposure drafts under consideration -- one on price-level
accounting and one on replacement-cost. South Africa has published a discussion paper on a value
approach. Argentina has sponsored price-level supplemental statements and is considering requiring this
basis for primary financial statements. For many years, Brazil has had an indexing system for property
and monetary items. Germany is considering replacement-cost disclosures for items financed by equity
capital. Several companies in The Netherlands have used a form of value accounting.
In the United States, the FASB in January, 1975 issued an exposure draft requiring supplemental
financial statements on a price-level basis, with a comment period that ended in September, 1975. The
FASB has deferred action and apparently does not know what to do now.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has had a proposal out for exposure with a comment period
that ended January 31, 1976. This proposal would require disclosure of the current replacement cost of
most inventories and depreciable, depletable, and amortizable assets used in the production process at
year-end and the approximate amount of cost of goods sold and depreciation, depletion, and amortiza-
tion that would have been recorded on the basis of the current replacement cost of inventories and
productive capacity.
As a result of all of this and other similar developments, it is becoming increasingly evident that these
problems exist on a worldwide basis and that attempts to solve the problems without common
objectives are makeshift at best and futile a worst. Whereas the United States has had an opportunity to
be a leader in objectives and basic concepts on the international scene, it certainly has not done so. All
we have here in this regard is confusion and controversy.
Assumption of Stability of Monetary Unit Not Valid
Accounting has used the dollar as its unit of measurement under the assumption that fluctuations in the
dollar's purchasing power will be so insignificant as not to undermine its usefulness for such purposes.
During certain periods, this assumption has squared substantially with reality. In an inflationary period,
however, it is difficult to justify the continued reliance on this premise.
By the use of a general index of purchasing power, price-level accounting adjusts the recorded amounts
to restate them in dollars of equal size, generally in terms of current dollars. Price-level accounting also
undertakes to measure, and reflect in the financial statements, the gains and losses in purchasing power
from holding monetary assets and liabilities. Incidentally, this feature, although generally associated
with price-level accounting, can be used in connection with other approaches to financial reporting.
That is, computing the gains or losses from holding monetary items can be done and the information
disclosed when the books are maintained on a historical-cost basis or on some variant of current value.
Price-level accounting has deserved more support in the past than it has received. There are no serious
or mysterious implementation problems because the procedures have been known for years and many
experimental applications have been successfully undertaken. In fact, our firm included price-level
adjusted statements as supplementary information in its most recent annual report.
Price-level accounting results in comparative statements that are comparable in terms of purchasing
power. Even modest rates of inflation erode the significance of comparative data. For instance, it is
widely understood that in recent years a sizeable share of the reported annual sales growth may have
been the result of inflation rather than of gains in physical volume. Yet, such a condition is widely
ignored and conclusions are reached about sales growth by reliance on data that are not comparable. On
the other hand, restating each year all of the prior financial statements shown on the basis of current
purchasing power has proven to be confusing to many readers.
A move to price-level adjusted financial statements would require much educational effort to
communicate the fact that a different kind of measurement of success or failure has been adopted as
well as some different accounting techniques. The fact is that such financial statements are not as easy
to understand or as complete in reflecting economic reality as value-based statements that include a
maintenance of capital concept.
We must recognize that price-level accounting, as it is generally propose, would follow existing
accounting principles and rely essentially on the same old concepts. My previously expressed concern
that accounting has lagged and failed to accommodate sufficiently the many new developments that
have occurred in business will not be put to rest by price-level accounting. Therefore, price-level
accounting should not now be viewed as necessarily a logical first step (as it might have been five to ten
years ago) that will initiate or lead to a change in the conceptual structure of accounting -- the kind of
fundamental change that is needed so much.
Replacement-Cost Accounting
A movement in favor of some form of replacement-cost accounting (sometimes referred to as current-
cost accounting) is obviously on the horizon. Many of the present proposals for this approach are partial
rather than comprehensive. For example, the replacement-cost proposal of the SEC would disclose
isolated and supplemental data only for those assets and associated expenses related to inventories, plant
and equipment, and natural resources. The position advocated by the Sandilands Report, which would
reflect current values in the primary financial statements, has a similar weakness in that the financial
reporting of some companies and some industries would be unaffected by the kind of current-value
accounting being advocated. Because a financial institution is not required to invest significant amounts
in inventory and plant and equipment, it may be exempt from the proposed accounting. However, it
does not follow that such an entity is unaffected by inflation. Also, the proposal does not reflect the
inflationary effect on other items in companies that do have inventories and productive property.
Should those proposals advocating a partial system of replacement-cost accounting be changed to
reflect a more comprehensive approach, there remains a weakness associated with any replacement-cost
system of accounting -- the reliance that is placed on a single value concept. In some cases, replacement
costs may increase while realizable values or earning potentials decline for specific assets. How relevant
is replacement-cost information under such circumstances?
While the replacement-cost approach tends to provide for the maintenance of productive capacity,
because specific increases or decreases in expenses that will likely be incurred when existing assets are
replaced are in effect anticipated, maintenance of productive capacity is usually a far different goal than
is the maintenance of equity capital.
Suppose that a change in technology occurs during an inflationary period. Are earnings being
realistically computed by applying lower than historical-cost depreciation during inflationary times
unless some provision is made to preserve the general purchasing power of the capital invested in the
business? If depreciation charges are reduced because replacement costs are lower, and as a
consequence greater earnings are reported and distributed as dividends, then conceivably the resources
retained within the business entity, though possibly sufficient to replace existing assets, might not have
the purchasing power invested initially by the stockholders or committed when earnings were retained
in the business. This kind of accounting can lead to misleading interpretations.
A replacement-cost system that does not incorporate within its framework some mechanism for capital
maintenance is subject to serious question. Some of the current proposals for piecemeal replacement-
cost accounting do not include such a general provision for capital maintenance.
Further, to require supplemental disclosure of certain replacement-cost data in notes to financial
statements may mislead investors rather than provide useful information about the value of business
assets. Unfortunately, the replacement cost of an asset often does not represent the "worth" or "value" of
that asset. The realizable value of a half-occupied office building may be far less than replacement cost.
Disclosure of replacement costs for inventories may imply that sales prices are based on such costs,
which may or may not be the case. Also, replacement costs for productive facilities may be
considerably higher in some cases whereas such new facilities may materially reduce operating costs,
and an incomplete portrayal of this could be misleading.
Value Concepts Readily Understandable
The kind of fundamental change that deserves attention is a major shift to value accounting. Such a
move does not require accountants to settle on one particular value concept now as the best for all or in
developing different value concepts, but reliance on a single value concept will probably never be
desirable. The value concept used should be one that offers the prospect of indicating the most relevant
approximation of an asset's value, taking into consideration such factors as feasibility and verifiability.
Because there has been relatively little use of value data in accounting, the practicing accountant has not
been really challenged to search for evidence about values. More verifiable support for value
information probably exists than is generally believed.
The cost basis is frequently defended by pointing out the complexity of value concepts and the
extensive differences of opinion that exist about values. Cost is not greatly different from value in this
regard because cost concepts are also complex. There can be many differences of opinion about the
computation of cost. Not only does cost-based accounting result in differences of opinion about the
initial recording of cost but, in the case of depreciable assets, estimates must be made about useful life
and salvage value. Hence, there is introduced into our present system of accounting the opportunity for
using a variety of amounts in accounting for similar, even identical, assets. In other words, differences
of opinion will exist in accounting whether it is cost-based or value-based.
Some interesting research was recently conducted by Professor James E. Parker that illustrates my
point.(2) He obtained information from businesses owning a specific model of a printing calculator
about the depreciated cost shown in the accounts when the asset was six years old. The amounts
reported ranged from zero to $280 for the same asset, all at the end of the sixth year. Furthermore, there
was no central pattern for the book values reported. Professor Parker also visited a number of businesses
dealing in office equipment. He showed them the same six-year old printing calculator and asked
whether they would be interested in purchasing it outright, not what it was worth as a trade-in. He
received a number of bona fide offers to purchase the six-year old asset. The bid prices ranged from $40
to $120, but 60% ranged between $60 to $80. This range is distinctly narrower than the zero to $280
reported following cost-based accounting, where a range of $80 to $200 was required to include 60% of
the businesses visited.
It would be inappropriate to generalize very much from this limited research. On the other hand, this
research illustrates what I believe to be true, that sweeping assertions to the effect that value ranges
would necessarily be wider than amortized cost balances are not necessarily valid. Accountants rely so
much on cost concepts and cost computations that they tend to lose perspective about how much
complexity and estimation are associated with the application of cost-based accounting.
Value-based accounting is really not radical. Considerable reliance is presently placed on value in the
application of the lower of cost or market approach to inventory valuation and the net realizable value
test for various assets. Managements regularly work with and are concerned about values. Many
knowledgeable people consider the present-day balance sheet as being of limited usefulness because it
conveys so little meaningful information.
Where Are We and Where Are We Going
Where are we and where are we going? The first part of the question is easy to answer. We are in a
conceptual mess. With respect to objectives and basic concepts and with respect to considering the best
way to reflect economic realities as they exist in business enterprises, the FASB has displayed no
effective leadership.
The second part of the question with respect to where we are likely to go is much more difficult to
answer. How much can be done on a piecemeal basis? What should be supplemental information and
what should be shown in the primary financial statements? Would price-level accounting prove to be a
step toward value account-ing? Can anything in this regard be done without first establishing
objectives?
This leads to the question -- do we now need evolution or revolution? For many years, I favored
evolution based on sound objectives because this would seem to be the orderly and sensible way to
achieve progress. However, the accounting profession has procrastinated for so long that the time for
evolution has been frittered away.
Therefore, this bicentennial year would be a good time for a major change in our approach to
accounting -- a rededication to establishing appropriate objectives to reflect economic realities. Let us
not be satisfied with piecemeal and half-baked efforts to dabble with our accounting problems. Let us
not be lulled into a sense of false security by complex disclosures and other superficial and confusing
patches. While the accounting profession proposes education for investors so they presumably can
better understand what is turned out by accountants, I propose that we first produce financial statements
that present the facts in as concise, clear, and understandable manner as possible.
What is needed so much as soon as feasible is a value-based system of account-ing supported by sound
objectives and implemented by consistent and coordinated standards, This should be accomplished in
the primary financial statements and not by complex supplemental disclosures, additional columns in
the financial statements, or by other patches on an outmoded approach.
1976 would be a great year for this kind of an accounting revolution!
(1) Paton W. A., "Accounting Procedures and Private Enterprise", The Journal of Accountancy, April
1948, p.288.
(2) *Parker James E., "Testing Comparability and Objectivity of Exit Value Accounting", The
Accounting Review, July 1975, p. 512.
SELECTED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question:
In connection with value accounting, first as someone who has had some experience over the past two
score years in estate planning and estate taxation, the problems of determining value are so grievous that
somehow or other in those contexts of value I can't help but think of the punchline of that classic
accounting anecdote where the question is, "what number do you have in mind?" Second, Mr. Kapnick,
I'm going to refer to a play that you're intimately familiar with, undoubtedly, Arthur Miller's play, The
Price. What is the price to be determined, value and use, value and exchange? But let me zero in even
more aggressively. Let me refer to three incidents that you're intimately familiar with where value was
certainly the standard. First, when Berny Corrifeld wanted to skim $10 million out of the Investors
Overseas Services mess, he took $15 million, I believe the number was, of land cost and zoomed it up
to $115 million and skimmed off $ 10 million, and when your firm was challenged, how did you permit
this to happen? The response in writing was "we're accountants, we have nothing to do with appraisals,
we cannot evaluate." Then in another context, a grievous one, the Four Seasons Nursing Homes
situation, where it is true its percentage of completion accounting which is a cost base approach but yet
approaching value, to try to factor in the value added as a result of the productive process. The briefs
that your firm wrote very persuasively and very effectively pointed out the fact that we are accountants,
we are not engineers and appraisers, and the third, far more recent when we read the Price Waterhouse
commentary, as the special auditors in behalf of the courts in a matter of Mattel, Inc., where the
inventory of that toy manufacturing outfit had to be brought down to value because of the obsolescence.
The accounting firm which was committed to a value standard even now according to Price
Waterhouse, fouled the nest grievously. The point I'm making is related quite directly to three incidents
that you are familiar with and then to say now you tell us how you are going to implement the value
concept.
Answer:
I would like to comment on each of those cases specifically because they are important in the
understanding of the value concept. I would like to mention first, as you indicate, that there can be wide
ranges already in the cost basis, and that is one point that I tried to make during my presentation. That is
nothing different as to the existence of ranges, whether you are on a cost basis or a value basis. Since
you refer to three cases, I would not want to go on without some comment on each of the three. I think
that the one thing that has been completely misunderstood in the IOS case, and I believe you refer to
this in your book, is the fact that the Board of Directors was required to value those assets. In a mutual
fund there is no way that the Board of Directors can avoid valuing those assets. Therefore, as to our
responsibility in that case, I want to make sure that everyone understood that we were reporting on the
basis of values determined by the Board of Directors. If anyone were to refer to our certificate in that
situation you would find it quite clear. We indicated that these values were based upon the opinion of
the Board (not the opinion of our firm), and that based upon such values the rest of the financial
statements were presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. I believe that
this was a clear discharge of an auditors' responsibility to point out that there was a very large asset on
which we were not giving an opinion as far as the valuation was concerned.
On the second case, the Four Seasons Nursing Homes situation, it should be remembered that the court
found two of our people innocent and had a hung jury of ten to two for acquittal on the third person. In
the Four Seasons case, the accounting that was followed was never successfully shown not to be
responsible accounting. Some of those who have talked a great deal about the Four Seasons case must
remember that to date no court has found the accounting to be lacking. We might digress a moment to
say in that case, as in other cases, the most frightening thing to the individuals involved is the power of
a Federal government to bring criminal action against individuals with unfounded allegations. The facts
that I have discussed, both publicly and privately, have supported the lack of credibility of the
government's case.
As far as the Mattel case is concerned, that is still in litigation, and I should not talk about that in detail.
However, it must be pointed out that where you have huge management fraud at the top officer level it
is very difficult for an auditor to detect, because the collusion is such as to present an almost
unauditable situation. Since that case is in major litigation, Mr. Briloff, I would prefer not to make any
further comments on it.
Now, let's address the more fundamental issue. Do those three cases destroy the idea that value is a
proper concept for reporting to shareholders? You refer to your experience in the estate planning. I am
not naive enough to believe that value accounting is easy. I do believe that in this world in which we
live the investor deserves better treatment in the type and amount of information than he is now
receiving. When you see the complex footnotes that are constantly being proposed for additional
disclosure, it is almost impossible for anybody other than the most sophisticated to understand the
financial statements. If that is where we are headed, we should take a good hard look at whether or not
the individual investor can determine for himself what is a proper security for him to invest in. I would
hope that with all the techniques that are available today we could come to a value approxima-tion that
would be just as significant to the investor as the historical cost basis, with respect to which he doesn't
understand what the values are.
One other matter that is important is the role of the independent auditor. I could encompass a lot in this
if I really wanted to cover everything, but the greatest disservice to the investor has been the use of the
short-form auditors' report. He reads that report and he thinks everything is all right. You refer to the
one qualified opinion of our firm that addressed itself to the very issue that you criticize, and yet how
many investors look at the report and think if there is a signature of a large firm, everything is all right?
There is a company in bankruptcy that was discussed in The Wall Street Journal this morning, but I
won't mention its name, in which a qualified opinion was given. What is the role of the auditor in those
situations? If he issues a qualified opinion, is that adequate? Some people are apparently beginning to
believe, but I don't happen to believe, that the role of the auditor should be expanded to such a point that
he has a right to determine whether or not a business survives. Our only responsibility is to make sure
that the facts are properly laid out. We may make a mistake once in a while, and we have to pay for
them because we are human too. But the real role for the auditor is to qualify his report, rather than to
walk away from the audit. The auditor should not have the power to bless or destroy. Rather, in my
opinion, his role is going to change that.
Question:
I think I got the feeling that you and your firm have proclaimed their independence from the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. What I'm interested in is that recently Touche Ross came out with a
program designed for experimentation where they also went into a value accounting approach. Now, to
the best of my knowledge of the reports I've seen from Arthur Andersen, there is that company in
Indiana where you have given an opinion on price-level-adjusted statements, but what is your program,
not for implementing the mechanics of value accounting but for implementing its acceptance, its use?
Answer:
There are several companies that are adopting, on an experimental basis, price-level accounting based
on general purchasing power. The one you refer to is Indiana Telephone Corporation, which was headed
by a very fine man by the name of Pierre Goodrich, who for many years felt that inflation would destroy
America. He tried to show what the inflationary impact was on private enterprise. What is our approach
to experimentation? I would like to see some real hardheaded dedication to what is really needed. It
does not take several years to adopt a sensible approach to the objectives of financial statements. In a
recent article we indicated that one of the fallacies that appears to be evolving at the FASB is that
political pressures are wrong. They say they are getting pressures from accounting firms, from
Congress, from industry, from academia, and from everywhere else. This is the democratic process, and
if you are going to have "due process, " you must have the ability to withstand the pressures and make
the necessary judgement decisions. The Board members were selected because of their integrity and all
of the attributes that were needed to withstand pressures. This is like what Harry Truman said, if you
can't stand the heat get out of the kitchen. We are at such a crucial point today that we need action. We
published statements on objectives of financial statements in 1972 and 1974, and we would like to see
companies experiment with them. In certain countries we are doing a great deal of work trying to help
clients determine values.
In one situation we had the SEC agree that supplemental financial statements on a value basis could be
put in a report to shareholders. Unfortunately, that client decided at the last minute that they did not
want to take the risk that went with that information at the particular time. There is a lot of
experimentation that could occur, but the first thing that must happen is to reach agreement on concepts.
Experimentation isn't going to be worth anything unless concepts are established by accountants and
others who are going to make this decision. If the accounting firms and the FASB can't get that decision
made, then all the experimentation that takes place is worth nothing, because we need to have
agreement on objectives first. There is no way that business is going to accept a change in approach
unless it is agreed upon as a uniform basis by the body which we've all agreed sets accounting
principles. I have told Russell Palmer, and I congratulate Touche Ross, that their booklet is excellent,
and they have come out with an excellent presentation. There may be a couple of other firms that will
support this concept, but why can't we seem to get it done and implemented?
Question:
I too support the concept, but I'm concerned and would like to comment on some of the things you said
were happening. Principally relating to the revolutionary aspect of affecting the change. You mention
that it has been some forty years since the price-level accounting techniques were first developed, and
you express your disap-pointment at the slow pace of evolutionary change. Yet, when the FASB finally
came out with their exposure draft on price-level accounting, much of the responses that they received
commented on the lack of understanding and lack of familiarity with the proposal and the consternation
that would result from price-level-adjusted financial statements on the part of an uneducated public. It
strikes me that after 40 years we've just reached a stage that to suggest revolution, when the techniques
for determining value as a sound concept may not have evolved at the same pace or to the same extent,
could result in a revolution that produces more in the way of chaos than improvement. If we have a
developed price-level accounting technique, even if it doesn't do the same thing and perhaps it isn't the
first step to reflect the impact of inflation on financial statements, perhaps it should be introduced on a
supplementary basis. The public would begin to get used to the concept of at least accounting for the
impact of inflation and might be better prepared then to cope with the new concept of accounting for
other factors that cause change in value. We should allow a period of time to lapse during which
corporations, the profession, and perhaps government could develop more specific types of tools that
business and the profession need to come up with current values that wouldn't be attacked as being too
conjectural and too subjective to have any usefulness. Could you comment on some of those thoughts?
Answer:
The basic issue that you are referring to, the issue of whether it will be understood by the public, is
whether there is a middle ground. I tried to indicate this in my presentation. I think that a middle ground
was available in the 1950's and the 1960's and certainly in the early 1970's, when price-level accounting
was the way to address the problem. However, we need to define the problem, because the facts are
being mixed up with a whole conglomeration of different concepts throughout the world. You can have
replacement accounting here; you can have general price-level accounting here; you can have some
historical cost in one place and the current cost under the Sandilands report in the U.K. Then I have to
ask, what does financial information mean on a worldwide basis? If we're going to really have
meaningful data, we have to have a common concept, the same as we have had a common concept of
historical cost. Except for the Netherlands, and except for Brazil where there was major inflation, we
have had essentially a cost concept throughout the world until now. Now the issue is -- are we willing to
have a fragmentation of that concept with all the variations that are being introduced? I have concluded
in my own evaluation that we can get self-satisfied with all the footnotes and all the supplemental
statements that we could have, but the investors are not going to understand them. They are not going to
be able to have a base on which to make the transition. Therefore, it seems to me the leadership that's
needed here is to develop a uniform value-based concept throughout the world.
We should stop to think about the third world. The problem of the next decade is transfer pricing that is
evolving in the U.N., in the OECD, and in other countries throughout the world. Transfer pricing isn't a
U.S. problem; it is not a U.K. problem; it is a world problem. How are we going to solve transfer
pricing problems? We finally have to get back to whether or not we have answers today, and this leads
to some sort of value-based concepts. This gives us the solution or the possibility of the solution to
many problems. The real thrust should be to reestablish the leadership of the United States profession in
getting to a value-based concept as quickly as possible. All changes should be stopped, except what is
absolutely needed, until we establish a new direction and start moving toward it.
Question:
We were privileged about a month ago to have a speaker who managed to describe financial accounting
as a joint costing problem. In particular I refer to Arthur Thomas. Yet today you came before us and
said, I can dismiss this notion of synergism between assets -- I can dismiss this notion of the firm as a
bundle of related assets. Could you go a little bit further and elaborate perhaps a little on how you
reached the conclusion that I can view assets individually without their synergism or joint effects?
Answer:
I'm not sure I have your point, but you may be talking about my comment that we do not look at the
value approach as encompassing the valuation of the entire enterprise. To determine value based upon
earnings becomes circulatory. The assets that are exchangeable and that have value in and of themselves
can be valued independently of the valuation of the total enterprise. For example, some assets might
continue to be valued on a cost basis; other assets might be valued on discounted cash flow; others
might be based on appraisal values. We believe that there is a whole variety of types of value concepts
that could be applied to provide meaningful data independent of the valuation of the total enterprise.
Question:
Somehow I believe that with a value system, though it is very good, shareholders would be quite
confused by having a new type of financial statements. We are now on a value base system and using
the consumer price index; we are not the same as last year and would have a problem with consistency.
Then again, you have to also consider some investors do not have the sophistication to even understand
what we do have already in annual reports, 1OKs, I0 Qs, and in various other items that we present to
the public. This is illustrated by the number of people who send away the little cards for the 10K that
various companies present. You also have to consider something else. For an unsophisticated investor,
what information does he really need in terms of value? If we change around value, some companies are
going to be very happy about it and some companies won't. Those who won't be satisfied with changing
values will be those who have high fixed assets of various kinds whose depreciation will change and
their performance will look worse than it did before. Or you'll have companies who look even better
now than they did before. If we are going to do something like this, we should have a setup that is fair
to the investors in terms of giving them information that they can handle at a pace they can handle
instead of just throwing it at them all at once. An example is the treatment of gains on the exchange of
debt. First, we threw it into retained earnings; then we took it out and put it on the income statement.
Now there is talk of bringing it back and putting it into retained earnings again. The investor is looking
at this and he sees high earnings, and there it is below the bottom line. There are gains from exchange of
long-term debts of $14 million with total net profit of $16 million. At least we've exposed it, but by
constantly changing things back and forth the benefits for either side really do not outweigh each other.
Someone is going to benefit more than the other, and it's not going to be the unsophisticated investor. It
is going to be the sophisticated investor. It is going to be mostly the company that is doing extremely
well, and it will be those companies that have something to benefit. Perhaps a jewelry concern who can
play around with the value of various stones. I have a client who would be happy to have something like
that. You have to be fair to all sides.
Answer:
There is always a good way to have a debate, and that is to answer a question with a question. You
made a very sweeping statement. Some companies are going to be better off and some companies are
going to be worse off. In relation to what? If I'm the investor, I'm paying for economic value.
Sometimes a stock gets up to 100 times earnings, or 120 times earnings, where supposedly investors are
trying to predict the earnings stream. Are you better off with economic value or are you better off with a
matching concept? The first question is -- what is the most reliable economic information that you can
give an investor who is reasonably intelligent? You say some of them might not understand it. Then you
get to the second point which obviously is the transitional problem. I think that in a transitional period
we probably should have not only the statements on a value basis but also statements on a historical-
cost basis. To ask a man on the street whether a building which is worth $500,000 should be put on the
balance sheet at $500,000, or whether it should be carried at its cost years ago, $100,000, you will find
out what he understands best. He doesn't need to be the most sophisticated investor to understand value.
As I travel around the world I find that people do understand value. They understand that cost which has
no relation to today's economic value is not meaningful. There are people who would say -- forget about
double entry if cost is to be the basis. Why do people make balance sheets on scratches of paper when
they are making acquisitions? They don't talk about cost; they talk about value. Don't underestimate the
small investor. Give him the right information, which does not take fifty pages of financial statements,
notes and schedules with all their complexities. Just give him 4 or 5 pages of real basic information.
Question:
I hope the question is sophisticated enough. I'm in accounting now, and we basically work with
historical cost. I just finished taking an income tax course. Income tax is a big element in the business
field, and I'd like to know how value accounting would affect income taxes. Would it take a whole
restructuring of tax laws currently existing?
Answer:
Well, not necessarily. I think that we may be evolving to where we are going to have to have two or
possibly three different types of systems in order to properly control a business. We will need a
management control system, which may be somewhat different from the financial reporting system to
shareholders. I realize that taxes are a very important part of the U.S. business climate, but taxation
should not control financial reporting. If we ever get to where the principles of taxation control
accounting, we get into a never, never land, because the purpose of taxation is to provide revenues, not
to present financial position and results of operations. There is a possibility that if some sort of value-
oriented accounting is adopted, the impact of inflation could become a tax deduction, I understand that
this was a major consideration behind the Sandilands report in the U.K. If some of you will talk to your
Congressmen and Senators, you will quickly find out that they tell you -- don't come to the Congress on
an inflation deduction unless you are prepared to report it to your shareholders. They are not even going
to consider a deduction for inflation unless companies are willing to report it to their shareholders. In
Brazil, it is a deduction. There is a tax deduction in Brazil for the fixed assets and working capital,
based upon indexes published by the government. These programs can be worked into the taxation
systems, but I would not hinge my case on the adoption of value accounting for taxation.
